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ABSTRACT   Mega-events such as the Olympic Games tend to be accompanied by copious media 
coverage of the negative social impact of the Games, and people in the affected areas are often thought to 
share similar experiences. The research in this paper, which focused on the Beijing Summer Olympic Games 
of 2008, unpacks the heterogeneous groups in a particular sector of the housing market to gain a better 
understanding of how the Games affected different resident groups. The paper critically examines the 
experience of migrant tenants and Beijing citizens (landlords in particular) in “villages-in-the-city” (known 
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pervasive demolition threats to their neighbourhoods. The paper argues that the Beijing Summer Olympiad 
produced an uneven, often exclusionary, Games experience for a certain segment of the urban population. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In urban China, migrants have only limited housing choices and experience insecurity of housing tenure, the 
conditions of which are framed by the imposition of temporary status through the continued exercise of 
hukou, a household registration system. This system, inherited from the planned economy era, regulates and 
limits access to urban social welfare provision (including public housing). This places unskilled migrants 
without abundant financial resources at greater disadvantage when they move to cities. Higher-income 
migrants have access to private home ownership and to a rental sector in the urban commercial housing 
market that has seen price spikes in most major cities in recent decades. For all other migrants, unless their 
accommodation is provided by their employers,(1) the major form of tenure is private rental tenure.(2) Low-
income migrants often end up settling in the urban fringes and in abandoned suburban industrial sites or in 
dilapidated inner-city areas where local Beijing residents rent out extra spaces for private rental income. 
Houses in these areas are usually in poor physical condition and often lack basic services.(3) However, they 
provide the most accessible and affordable solution to migrants’ need to stay close to their jobs under severe 
financial constraints.(4) 
 When Beijing was preparing for the 2008 Summer Olympic Games, the municipality carried out 
numerous “environmental improvement projects” (a euphemism for demolition and displacement) in what 
are known as chengzhongcun or “villages-in-the-city” (hereafter VICs), where migrant tenants far outnumber 
local Beijing permanent residents. These VICs are loci of informal building practices that evade municipal 
building codes, providing low-quality shelters predominantly for migrant tenants who cannot find affordable 
dwellings in central districts.(5) In Beijing, they are dilapidated residential areas often located in urban fringes 
or former industrial sites, classified by some academics in China as being part of “urban corners”, to indicate 
their marginal position.(6) While these VICs are found on a large scale in major cities across mainland China, 
their origin and development patterns show variations.(7) One important shared feature is the informal 
building practices of former farmers, who densify their own dwellings to provide extra space for private 
lease to migrants in order to gain rental income. Building density tends to be very high in the Pearl River 
delta region, somewhat less so in Beijing. VICs, then, may not originally have been “informal settlements”, 
but they are informal in nature given the prevalent informal building practices that are the basis of their 
development.  
 According to a government survey, about 332 VICs existed in Beijing’s central and near suburban 
districts as of the early 2000s.(8) In September 2004, the Beijing municipal government decided to carry out 
“environmental improvement” projects in 231 VICs accommodating 33,935 households, aiming to complete 
these projects in 171 VICs before the 2008 Olympic Games.(9) The projects were overseen by a municipal 
organization, the 2008 Environmental Construction Head Office set up in December 2005, working with 
other district governments. It was estimated that the demolition of 171 VICs might lead to the eviction of 
about 74,100 permanent village residents and about 296,400 migrants. 
 The demolition of VICs can incur heavy costs not only for the migrant tenants but also the local 
village landlords whose livelihoods depend largely on rental revenues. While some studies have referred to 
the issue of mass displacement through urban renewal(10) and the use of the Games as a means to draw public 
attention away from this exacerbation of inequalities,(11) they tend to draw on secondary sources and personal 
observations for discussions. This paper presents post-Games empirical findings in an attempt to examine the 
experience of migrant tenants and Beijing citizens, including village landlords, by drawing on their first-hand 
accounts of how their lives were disrupted by the citywide preparations for the Olympic Games and how 
they experienced the Games. The research attempts to unpack the heterogeneous groups (in terms of tenure 
and residency status) in a particular sector of the housing market, and gain a better understanding of how the 
Olympic Games affected different resident groups.  
 Three main arguments are put forward. First, the loss of VICs associated with the preparations for 
the Olympic Games was an intensification of exclusionary practices routinely experienced by Beijing 
migrants. Despite moving to other remaining VICs to prevent their living costs from rising, they were 
expected disproportionately to bear the costs of the Games, experiencing disruption to their lives and going 
through involuntary house moves, often to locations further from the city centre. Second, the landlords in 
VICs were also affected, since rentals from the demolished buildings had been a major source of household 
income. Third, there was a clear division between the two groups (migrants and Beijing citizen landlords) in 
terms of their participation in neighbourhood activities associated with the celebration of the Olympic 
Games, reinforcing the identity of migrants to Beijing as outsiders. 
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II. MEGA-EVENTS AND URBAN MARGINAL POPULATION 
 
While host cities and countries find mega-event hosting to be “… an opportunity for a massive physical and 
image make-over”,(12) mega-events are criticized for their role in making cities work for visitors, while 
neglecting the needs of local residents and producing an uneven distribution of material costs and benefits.(13) 
The demolition of affordable dwellings, incurring residents’ displacement, has often been cited as one of the 
major negative social impacts of such mega-events as the Olympic Games.(14) Various reports suggest that 
such displacement is larger in scale and more brutal in nature in developing countries.(15) A report by the 
Centre on Housing Rights and Eviction indicates that the number of Beijing residents displaced as a result of 
Olympics-related urban (re)development projects between 2000 and 2008 is estimated to be about 1.5 
million (about 14 per cent of Beijing’s permanent residents).(16) As COHRE speculates, these numbers are 
unlikely to include migrants, as government reports usually refer only to those permanent local residents who 
are eligible for compensation. 
 Critics further argue that it is the powerless in society who disproportionately bear the burden of 
cities being constructed to cater to the needs of visitors rather than local inhabitants.(17) Those poorer 
segments of society and those who are socially marginalized tend to go through an experience that is 
detached from the rest of the city’s festive mood.(18) For instance, in Athens, the Romani population was the 
main victim of evictions during the city’s preparations for the 2004 Summer Olympic Games, an attempt by 
the authorities to keep them away from the Games venues.(19) In Seoul, during the preparations for the 1988 
Seoul Olympic Games, one of the most brutally oppressed groups was the low-income communities whose 
settlements were near the Olympic torch path, as the government did not want them to be visible to the 
media.(20) Delhi, as host city to the 2010 Commonwealth Games, also saw the intensifying “… 
aestheticization of city space”,(21) as slums in central city areas were removed in order to transform the city 
image in line with the “world class city” vision that Delhi promoted. 
 The negative social impact of mega-events is often overshadowed by the politics of the events. In 
developing countries in particular, hosting mega-events such as the Olympic Games and the FIFA World 
Cup has been frequently associated with such national political trends as nation-building in formerly divided 
countries;(22) the promotion of multicultural national identity;(23) the signalling of re-entry of the host country 
into the global community;(24) and changes to political institutions.(25) Host nations engage with symbolic 
politics, mobilizing social support to achieve particular visions of the state.(26) This association of mega-
events with national politics suggests that any opposition to mega-event hosting may easily be interpreted as 
challenging the ruling regime, thus risking oppression. Furthermore, as Short notes, a mega-event ironically 
“… reinforces nationalism” rather than transcending it.(27) The national prestige associated with mega-events 
such as the Olympics and the use of patriotic sentiment boosted by the national government produce an 
unfavourable political environment for those expressing dissent or objecting to government policies. Social 
outcasts such as homeless people or persistent protesters against government policies are often criminalized 
and kept away from the public.(28) 
 These critical studies suggest that when we examine the experience of the marginalized groups in an 
Olympic project, we need to examine both the physical and subjective experiences of the affected, shaped 
within the political economic constraints of the host nation. It is also necessary to have a longer historical 
view(29) so that the role of demolition of low-income settlements in urban policy-making can be better 
understood. Therefore, in our study on the experiences of Beijing’s VICs residents, which includes both 
migrant tenants and their landlords, we will also focus on their physical and subjective experiences of the 
Games. 
 
 
III. RESEARCH DATA 
 
In order to clearly understand VIC residents’ experiences of the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games, we 
carried out post-Games fieldwork involving qualitative interviews with migrant workers as well as village 
landlords of formerly rural origin. These interviews were carried out between December 2008 and January 
2009 in the suburban district of Haidian; Beijing is known for its concentric ring-roads, and the areas around 
and beyond the fourth ring-road are usually described as “near suburban” areas (Figure 1). 
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FIGURE 1 
Location of study areas 
SOURCE: Figure reproduced by Hyun Bang Shin 
 
 
 Official statistics indicate that as of 2008, 27.4 per cent of all permanent Beijing residents were 
migrants, the majority of whom (56 per cent) lived in the near suburban districts of Haidian, Chaoyang, 
Fengtai and Shijingshan (Table 1). Haidian was chosen for the field research as it had the largest share of 
VICs, when the municipal government identified 231 VICs for demolition by 2010.(30) Its nearly one million 
migrants constituted about one-third of its total population. Three Haidian neighbourhoods were selected 
based on accessibility and proximity to the city centre. One neighbourhood (MG) (Initials are used for all 
three neighbourhoods in order to preserve anonymity) is located just outside the northern section of the third 
ring-road near disused rail tracks north of Beijing North Station; the second neighbourhood (SM) lies just 
outside the northern section of the fourth ring-road near Tsinghua University and Yuanmingyuan; and the 
third neighbourhood (QH) is adjacent to the intersection between the fifth ring-road and G6 Jing Zang 
expressway. QH consists of three sub-neighbourhoods, named QH 2-Street, QH 3-Street and QH 4-Street. 
As part of the redevelopment, QH 2-Street and QH 3-Street were undergoing demolition, starting in 2005 
and 2006, respectively, according to QH interviewees, and remained on-going as of December 2008. Official 
estimates of the population size were not available, but the interviewees suggested that local Beijing 
households in MG, SM and QH 4-Street reached 50−60, 150 and 1,000 households, respectively. House 
rents fell with distance from the city centre so that on average people paid lower monthly rents in QH (24−35 
yuan/square metre) than in SM (40−50 yuan/square metre) or MG (35−71 yuan/square metre). 
 
TABLE 1 
Permanent population and density in Beijing, 2008 
 
 Population (‘000s) Population 
density (persons 
per km2 
  Migrants % 
population 
 
Beijing (total) 16,950 4,651 27.4 1,033 
Inner-city districts 2,083 381 18.3 22,546 
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         Dongcheng 553 101 18.3 21,823 
         Xicheng 673 112 16.6 21,284 
         Chongwen 297 53 17.8 17,978 
         Xuanwu 560 115 20.5 29,614 
Near suburban districts 8,356 2,601 31.1 6,549 
         Haidian 2,930 906 30.9 6,802 
         Chaoyang 3,083 998 32.4 6,775 
         Fengtai 1,753 489 27.9 5,733 
         Shijingshan 590 208 35.3 6,997 
Outer suburban districts 4,708 1,443 30.6 748 
Other districts and 
counties 
1,803 226 12.5 206 
 
SOURCE: Tables 3-3 and 3-4 in Beijing Statistical Yearbook, 2009 
Beijing Municipal Bureau of Statistics (2009), Beijing Statistical Yearbook 2009, China Statistics Press, 
Beijing, pages 55-56 
 
 A total of 48 qualitative interviews were conducted: 17 in MG, 10 in SM and 21 in QH. Interviewees 
were selected from various parts of each neighbourhood, taking into account their tenure and household 
registration status: 28 were migrant tenants and 20 were local Beijing permanent residents, the latter divided 
into two groups, 14 landlords and six non-landlords. Migrant tenants, recruited through the snowball 
technique, had moved due to demolition during the pre-Games period. The average period of residence in 
Beijing for migrant interviewees was 5.9 years for those in QH, 3.5 years in SM and 6.7 years in MG. 
 
 
IV. EFFICACY OF GOVERNMENT’S DEMOLITION POLICY 
 
According to the Haidian district mayor, 47 VICs were to be subject to environmental improvement by 
December 2006 as part of the Games preparations, involving the demolition of 2,215,000 square metres of 
illegal construction.(31) In its 2009 annual yearbook, the Haidian district government summed up its Olympic-
related improvement efforts, stating that 63 VICs and urban corners were subject to comprehensive 
improvement.(32) 
 Progress was slower than planned. For instance, while the district government aimed to implement 
29 VIC projects, displacing 2,872 households, during 2005 and 2006, only five had been completed and 
1,542 households displaced by December 2006, a completion rate of 53.7 per cent.(33) For instance, West 
Street in SM was supposed to be regenerated but this clearly did not happen. As one landlord interviewee 
living with his parents said: 
 
“It’s been said during the last 10 years that this place would be demolished ... Before the Olympic 
Games, newspapers said SM West Street would be demolished, but until now, nothing has been 
demolished.” (male, landlord in his thirties, S3)(34) 
 
The selection criteria for the 171 Beijing VICs intended for demolition before the Games could also be 
questioned. While some VICs experienced wholesale demolition, such as those located on what became the 
Olympic Park complex, only those parts of some VICs that were essential to the Games would have been 
demolished because of the time constraints. This was the case with the demolition of QH village, whereby 
although the village as a whole constitutes a large area divided by the QH River, only a small section of QH 
4-Street, located in the southeastern corner where it meets the expressway, was designated for demolition, to 
be turned into a green space (Figure 2). This project was announced as an Olympic Games-related VIC 
improvement project in July 2006. The area to the east of the expressway, which used to be a large VIC, was 
also demolished to make way for the Olympic Park complex. The case of QH 4-Street’s partial demolition 
clearly indicates that the government’s attempts to demolish VICs as part of the Games preparations might 
have left some VICs only partly affected rather than completely eradicated. As a landlady in her fifties from 
MG village said, talk concerning VIC demolition might have been “… only a slogan” for some areas, as “… 
the state did not have the strength” (M16). 
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FIGURE 2 
QH village precinct and the location of demolition areas 
SOURCE: Figure reproduced by Hyun Bang Shin 
 
 
V. UNDERSTANDING THE CONSEQUENCES OF DEMOLITION PROJECTS: VIEWS OF THE 
VILLAGE LANDLORDS 
 
To village landlords, the news of the demolition of other VICs as part of the Olympic Games clean-up 
provoked mixed feelings about the future of their own neighbourhoods. Among the 14 village landlord 
interviewees, 11 were aware of the demolition of VICs within the fourth ring-road or near major Olympic 
venues, but they were rather sceptical about the necessity for this. For instance, a 53 year-old landlord in SM 
(S7) claimed that demolition was “… definitely because of the Olympic Games. If not, could the demolition 
be taking place so hastily? I feel like this village does not need to be demolished, as it would be difficult to 
relocate [villagers].” His view was echoed by another landlady in her sixties from SM (S10), who indicated 
that the number of migrants in her neighbourhood increased because “… chengzhongcun within the fourth 
ring-road were demolished and people had no place to live but to squeeze into outside areas.”  
 The very survival of the study neighbourhoods, however, suggests that the eradication of all targeted 
VICs in Beijing would require greater effort and a longer timeframe. Talks of demolition and redevelopment 
have been around for many years in both SM and MG, making local residents weary of years-long 
government inaction to address neighbourhood dilapidation. The inability to enforce the projects generated a 
sense of instability: “For more than 10 years people were talking about redevelopment but it has not taken 
place until now” (male, landlord in his thirties, S3). “From the 1980s there were discussions about 
demolition in this area, but nothing has happened. Whether or not demolition takes place is a matter for the 
state, and has no relationship with us” (male, 43 year-old landlord, M5). 
 As for landlords living in QH 4-Street, the slow process of demolition in the adjacent 
neighbourhoods QH 2-Street and QH 3-Street (Figure 2) provided a reference point against which they could 
draw provisional conclusions about the future of their own neighbourhood: 
 
“This area is definitely not going to be demolished. You know, as far as demolition is concerned, there 
is no fixed schedule. You say the QH 3-Street neighbourhood is undergoing demolition, but it’s been 
five years since the notice. Even though demolition has begun and takes place continuously, it has not 
finished yet. Only half-way through. So, our place here, nobody knows when it’s going to be 
demolished.” (male, landlord in his fifties, Q4-11) 
 
In a departure from more general assumptions, landlords and local Beijing residents were often eager to have 
their neighbourhoods demolished and redeveloped as they considered it a means to improve their own living 
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conditions. They were also quick to point out the need for adequate compensation. While regulations exist to 
provide either in-kind (in the form of relocation housing) or cash compensation, the latter has become the 
norm since the early 2000s.(35) Local village landlords and public sector tenants were aware of the 
compensation policies and during the interviews, indicated the level of cash compensation they wished to 
receive. 
 What is more concerning to the residents is the loss of future rental income. For many, rental 
payments were an important source of extra income. The 11 landlord interviewees who disclosed their 
holdings had on average 10 tenant households and earned approximately 39,300 yuan per year. This was 57 
per cent of Beijing’s average household disposable income in 2008.(36) The highest rental income was 
enjoyed by a 52 year-old landlord interviewee in SM (S1) who was renting out 17 out of 27 units at the time 
of the interview and earned about 112,200 yuan per year. In about 2004, the family informally added two 
more storeys to an original 120 square-metre one-storey dwelling. The second highest rental income was 
earned by a 72 year-old landlord in MG who had 10 tenant households (M12). He added a second floor in 
1985 to add more living space, and then spent around 150,000 yuan to add another floor in 2003 for renting. 
As he charged between 500 and 700 yuan per unit, it would have taken less than three years to recover the 
initial investment. As the earlier interviewee S1 mentions, rental income was the main, if not the only, source 
of family income. Migrant tenants were also aware of this situation. A 30 year-old male migrant stated: “If 
demolition takes place, there is no more income source. For the local [Beijing] resident, house rent is the 
income source” (Q4-2). Demolition, cash compensation and relocation (or re-housing on site) would 
improve the physical living conditions for these landlords but would destroy the basis of their major 
household income. 
 
 
VI. VIEWS OF MIGRANT TENANTS: “WE’D JUST MOVE AND FIND ANOTHER PLACE” 
 
Migrant tenants were much less concerned than landlords about neighbourhood demolition. With regard to 
the citywide demolition of VICs, the majority of migrant interviewees (19) said they had not heard of the 
news or were not interested in following up the development. While private rental dwellings in VICs were 
the most accessible means of residence for migrants in Beijing, they were guaranteed no protection upon 
demolition. Cash or in-kind compensation is only for local permanent residents in owner-occupation or 
public rental tenure. The outcome for private tenants depends largely on their relationship with landlords. 
Usually, migrant tenants receive little protection, as an interviewee (Q4-2) stated: “This [compensation] has 
no relation to us nor to my interest ... let it be their concern.” 
 Migrants were well aware of their fundamentally insecure position in the city. They showed little 
expectation of tenure security, showed no strong sense of attachment to their existing residence and did not 
expect compensation for displacement. Of the 28 migrants interviewed, 17 had moved at least once while in 
Beijing, 11 of them because of demolition. Irrespective of their previous demolition experience, they held the 
view that, upon demolition, “… we’d just move and find another place to live.” One migrant, a 24 year-old 
woman (Q4-4), mentioned that she did not pay attention to demolition simply “… because we are migrants.” 
Her statement echoed the view that “… we migrants have no rights” (M3) and “… we migrants do not 
receive any benefits” (M9) from the government upon demolition. The restriction on their housing choices, 
the institutional constraints from the exercise of the household registration system and the continual efforts 
by the municipal government to eradicate accessible residential space such as VICs were accepted as part of 
their life.  
 Given the scale of demolition in the short time span before the Olympic Games, one would wonder 
whether the migrants were under pressure to pay higher rents. Eight interviewees reported that rents in the 
surrounding areas went up, and three interviewees who had to move indeed paid higher rents, as they wanted 
to stay close to their original place of residence. Interviewee Q4-10 (28 year-old male), who worked in a 
supermarket, paid 400 yuan compared to 260 yuan previously. His new residence was close to his previous 
neighbourhood, near the northeastern corner of the Olympic Park. 
 However, looking for affordable or cheaper places to live was a priority. As a 34 year-old male 
migrant living in QH 3-Street stated (Q3-4): “If demolition takes place, rents will go up, and it is not a good 
thing … it is better to have cheaper rents even if living conditions are worse.” Keeping rents manageable 
was the motive for looking for places further out. A female migrant in her forties (Q4-8), working at Beijing 
University No 3 Hospital, used to live near the hospital in the northern section of the third ring-road but had 
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to move about five kilometres away to keep the same level of rent (about 300 yuan). This was a common 
experience. A 43 year-old migrant (Q4-3), a garbage collector, stated:  
 
“From here to the north, around Xi’erqi village, rent is 100 something yuan ... At present, we can’t 
save money while living here. We cannot even save eight or 10 yuan per day. We would not be able to 
afford to live here.” 
 
The continued availability of alternative VICs such as QH 4-Street and Xi’erqi allowed migrant tenants to 
find affordable dwellings when they needed to move. Even if 171 out of 231 VICs had been demolished 
before the start of the Olympic Games, as the government claimed,(37) this still left 60 VICs on their priority 
list for demolition by 2010; and the number remaining rises if we accept the government estimate of 332 
VICs in Beijing by the early 2000s. As noted above, village landlords respond to the housing market by 
densifying their houses in order to provide more rental rooms for increased numbers of tenants. In this way, 
the capacity of the existing VICs to accommodate migrant tenants multiplied quickly. Landlords’ intention to 
build more was clearly spelt out by a landlady in her sixties (S10): 
 
“This year, our state just hosted the Olympic Games. It spent a lot of money and currently does not 
have the energy to renovate this place. It may stop and rest for a year or two before it begins 
demolition. After waiting a couple of years, if the state does not demolish this place of ours, I will 
build. If it does the demolition, I will not build.” 
 
Informal construction of rental dwellings by village landlords also provided tenants with extra assurance that 
demolition might not happen in the short term. As a 30 year-old male migrant (Q4-2) said: “You look at the 
houses here. Many landlords built flats and rented them out, so in the short term, demolition may not 
happen” (Q4-2). 
 
 
VII. WHOSE GAMES? MIGRANTS’ EXCLUSIONARY EXPERIENCE OF THE OLYMPIAD 
 
A number of news reports emerged around the time of the Games on how they were received among the 
Chinese. Mainstream local Chinese media tended to report positive reactions from the public regarding the 
grandeur of the Olympic Games and the national prestige associated with the mega-event. Having failed 
earlier in competition with Sydney in the bid for the 2000 Olympic Games, Beijing’s chance to host the 2008 
Games was an opportunity to prove to the world that China had finally integrated with the world economy, 
endorsed earlier in part by its accession to the World Trade Organization. 
 But there were also news reports of exclusionary experiences of the Games among migrants. 
Migrants, who were the builders of the Olympic city, were effectively excluded from sharing the joy of the 
Games, affected by many restrictions and bans imposed as part of Beijing’s environmental control. The 
Beijing Organizing Committee for the Games of the XXIX Olympiad (hereafter BOCOG) produced the 
Beijing Olympic Action Plan,(38) and its Social Environment Development section specifically classified the 
management of migrants as part of the government’s actions on “security, health care and sanitation”. It 
stated: 
 
“Maintaining good social order − the projects of ‘safe community’ and ‘science- and technology-based 
security’ will be continued. Specifically, we will continue enhancing the public security 
structures from the grassroots and building a complete anti-criminal network among the citizens. 
Management of the floating population in the city shall be further improved and services will be 
provided.” 
 
A citywide social cleansing operation to clear the streets of social undesirables was strengthened in early 
2008,(39) affecting beggars, street vendors and unlicensed businesses. Construction sites and factories were to 
close temporarily during the months preceding the Games in order to improve the quality of Beijing’s 
polluted air, and migrant workers in these sectors were “persuaded” to leave Beijing.(40) As government 
security measures were tightened, ID checks for city-bound travellers were introduced to discourage migrant 
commuters from entering Beijing, under the name of and described as “management of the floating 
populations”. Several VIC landlords reported the impact of such exclusion: they had fewer tenants and lost 
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rental income, especially in QH where migrants were concentrated: “[Our] family’s [rental] income 
decreased from July [2008], as many [migrant] tenants went back home” (A 46 year-old landlady from QH, 
Q3-1).  
 Various civil codes (and penalties) were also implemented to encourage “civilized” behaviour. 
Rural-to-urban migrants were often viewed by urban local residents and policy enforcers as being 
“uncultured”, and were more negatively affected by the disciplinary measures than urban citizens. These 
codes also included no use of rickshaws in the city centre and other Games areas. Unauthorised activities that 
were deemed informal and uncivilised by the municipality were to be hidden from the view of local residents 
and visitors during the Games period. These restrictions were relaxed only after the closing of the Games, as 
the symbolic image of a rickshaw driving along the main artery next to the main Olympics stadium shows 
(Photo 1). 
 
PHOTO 1 
Olympic main stadium, Bird’s Nest and a rickshaw 
SOURCE OF PHOTO: Photograph by Hyun Bang Shin, 2008 
 
 
 
 These restrictions on everyday life were felt by migrant interviewees who stayed behind in Beijing 
during the Games, enduring hardship because of constraints on their income-generating activities. A 30 year-
old male interviewee (Q4-2) recollected the temporary closure of his wife’s clothing store located in the 
Wudaokou area of Haidian district. Another 45 year-old migrant (Q4-5) experienced difficulties when he 
could not run his bicycle repair street stall between 20 July and 20 September. Another family (Q4-4) had to 
move because the lorry they lived in did not have a Beijing number plate and was not allowed to park at their 
previous residence located near the northern section of the fourth ring-road, not far from the main Olympic 
complex. 
 Migrants’ inequitable experience of the Games was also evident in their exclusion from various 
neighbourhood-based cultural and sports activities that were part of the Games celebration. These activities, 
largely organized by grassroots organizations such as neighbourhood residents’ committees or local sub-
district governments, were attended by more than “… 80 per cent of local villagers” (50 year-old male 
interviewee in QH, Q4-11), and were “…100 per cent for local villagers”, that is, with no participation of 
migrants (72 year-old male interview in MG village). While local Beijing citizens described their experience 
of participating in the Olympic Games-related volunteering activities, migrants considered those festive 
activities to be none of their business and mostly stayed away. Their deep-rooted perception that migrants 
were mostly excluded from neighbourhood affairs was expressed cynically by a migrant interviewee: “The 
neighbourhood committee ignores us and only cares about birth control” (Q4-5). One of the migrants 
expressed frustration about his attempt to participate in one of these neighbourhood activities: 
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“At the time of the Olympic Games, there was an activity organized in this place, and I went to watch 
it as it looked lively. A person, who looked like a person in the Street Office, saw me and said: ‘Where 
are you from and where are you going?’ So I said: ‘Did I cause anything to anyone? Did I do 
anything that violates the law?’ His eyes were looking down on people. Their vision is to discriminate 
against migrants ... Actually, we migrants and local people [from Beijing] are two different kinds, and 
they are not interested in migrants.” (male, 52 year-old landlord, S1) 
 
The migrants’ experience of the Olympic Games reflects the decades-long consolidation of inequalities 
based on the policy of household registration, which severely constrains migrants’ rights in their destination 
cities. These inequalities are accompanied by stigmatization and marginalization in cities that they helped to 
build. Migrants are often looked down upon by local residents, who use such expressions as suzhi tai cha, 
literally translated as “the quality is poor” (or not up to standard), possibly referring to such characteristics as 
ill manners and low levels of education. The punitive measures put in place around the time of the Olympics 
reflect the bias and stigmatization frequently associated with migrants.(41)  
 
 
VIII. PATRIOTISM AND THE OLYMPIC GAMES 
 
The Beijing Olympiad’s official slogan “One World, One Dream” was visible from every corner of Beijing 
when the city hosted the 2008 Summer Olympic Games (Photo 2). On the BOCOG website,(42) it states that 
the slogan: 
 
“… expresses the common wishes of people all over the world, inspired by the Olympic ideals, to 
strive for a bright future of Mankind. In spite of the differences in colours, languages and races, we 
share the charm and joy of the Olympic Games, and together we seek for the ideal of Mankind for 
peace. We belong to the same world and we share the same aspirations and dreams.” 
 
PHOTO 2 
Street fence with Olympic slogan: “One World, One Dream” 
SOURCE OF PHOTO:  Photograph by Hyun Bang Shin, 2008 
 
 
 
 In contrast to the international orientation of the slogan, mega-events such as the Olympic Games are 
often imbued with patriotic sentiment, which creates great challenges for any anti-Olympic movement or 
protest against the government’s policies. During the preparations for the Games and their subsequent 
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hosting, government policies and actions were often rebranded as being related to the Olympic Games, thus 
giving them a sense of urgency and exception. The Games were also thought to have been used as a way of 
diverting public attention away from social discontent and “… as a propaganda tool to promote national 
cohesion and rally an increasingly divided people around a common cause.”(43) The public support was high 
among Beijingers, as demonstrated by the 94.6 per cent support rate reported by an independent survey 
conducted in February/March 2000.(44) 
 Such exceptionally high support for the Games was sustained, and possibly strengthened, as the 
entire Chinese state disseminated pro-Olympic Games messages through the central and municipal 
governments. Patriotism was heavily emphasized during the Games preparations and neighbourhoods were 
decorated with slogans and placards that delivered pro-Olympic, patriotic messages (Photo 3). While “One 
World, One Dream” was its official slogan, the Beijing Olympic Games website displayed five main spirits 
of the Beijing Olympic Games in Chinese, giving top priority to the patriotic spirit for the glory of the 
country. The 2008 Olympic Games was indeed a major moment not only for the city but also for the country 
to promote itself and consolidate its confidence and pride, both domestically and internationally. 
 
PHOTO 3 
Placard in a Beijing neighbourhood 
NOTE: The words on the banner translate as: “For the glory of the mother land, for the glory of the Olympic 
Games”. 
SOURCE OF PHOTO: Photograph by Hyun Bang Shin, 2007 
 
 
 This exceptional atmosphere, coordinated by the state, seemed to make migrant tenants and village 
landlords more tolerant of their harsh treatment and of the disruption to their livelihoods due to the mounting 
pressure of demolition. For instance, a 28 year-old male migrant interviewee (Q4-10) stated explicitly that 
even if the demolition of the VICs within the fourth ring-road might have incurred costs to migrants: 
 
“This is okay, as hosting the Olympic Games is a major state affair, a very rare event. We can 
understand these arrangements by the state. Hosting the Games raises our country’s profile. Incurring 
a little bit of costs to my family is not a big deal, as long as the loss is not huge.” 
 
This view was echoed by a village landlord (Q4-11) who held a Beijing hukou: “The Olympic Games is the 
nation’s major event and is our glory. We should support it strongly. Every resident should support it. Even 
if there is a sacrifice to make, we should endure it.” 
 
 
IX. CONCLUDING DISCUSSION 
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In their discussion about the material legacy of hosting international mega-events, Whitson and Macintosh 
argue that identifiable benefits are not evenly shared among citizens, and call for the reconceptualization of 
urban development and promotion to be more inclusive.(45) Our study of the impact of the Beijing Olympic 
Games on migrants and village landlords, as well as their experience of the Games, supports other claims 
about the uneven distribution of the benefits and costs of the Olympic Games. We find that they have 
reinforced existing socioeconomic and political inequalities, and our findings testify to Eitzen’s argument 
that “… the powerless bear the burden.”(46) In China, the sharp distinction between migrants’ and local 
citizens’ right to the city is embedded in society.(47) Critics point out that local governments are increasingly 
redefining urban citizenship and associated benefit entitlements, giving preference to locally registered 
permanent residents irrespective of their rural or urban status.(48) Village landlords, although Beijing citizens, 
were negatively affected by the demolition pressure on Beijing’s VICs, which saw the selective targeting of 
VIC locations strategically related to the Olympics. Migrants, as outsiders, faced exclusionary experiences of 
the Olympic Games, even though they were the backbone of Beijing’s Olympic city construction. 
 In this paper, we have also shown that a more nuanced understanding is needed with regard to the 
analysis of the negative impact of the Olympic Games preparations on migrants’ access to affordable 
housing in the city. First, the actual demolition, while being substantial, might still have left a significant 
share of existing VICs intact or only partly affected. As the example of QH village suggests, some VICs 
would have seen only part of the neighbourhood, rather than the entire area, being subject to demolition. The 
presence of remaining villages would have allowed migrants to “hop” from one demolished village to 
another, thus keeping the housing costs down while experiencing inconvenience due to longer commuting 
times. For migrants, it appears that housing tenure security is less of a concern than other practicalities when 
deciding whether to move.(49) As Beijing expands and its inner-city areas are redeveloped, low-skilled 
migrants without the resources to access private home ownership are pushed further out to suburban areas 
where affordable places such as VICs are concentrated. This has been further facilitated by the construction 
of extensive mass transport infrastructure, the metro line expansion in particular, and the hugely subsidized 
passenger fares. It is possible that the expected “slow death” of VICs in relatively central districts of Beijing, 
in its bid to become a “world city”, will take place alongside the growth of VICs in outer suburban districts, 
thus producing a bifurcated city with spatial segregation. 
 A further question to be answered is why the harsh and unjust treatment of migrants in particular 
was accepted. While acknowledging the intensified security measures during the Games period, we highlight 
the role of nationalism and the promotion of patriotic sentiment in bringing stability to the country and 
diverting public attention away from domestic disputes. As Parker describes, the Beijing Olympic Games 
became “… an outlet for Chinese nationalist fervour.”(50) It makes marginalized populations more tolerant of 
the unequal treatment during the Games preparations and hosting period. The Games brought the Chinese 
people behind the Beijing Olympic slogan “One World, One Dream”, even if it was a nightmare for some 
individuals. Migrants were badly treated not only because of the constraints on their economic activities but 
also because of the citywide demolition of accessible residential space. Village landlords suffered, 
sometimes losing their only source of income. When mega-event hosting is combined with heightened 
nationalism, vulnerability can be partially disguised. As the excitement of the Olympic Games fades away, 
the various social pressures suppressed before and during the Games period resurface, brewing new sources 
of social tension. 
 The findings of this research have implications for future mega-events in developing countries where 
the intensity of urban development is likely to produce a similar degree of demolition and displacement in a 
relatively narrow time frame. It is necessary to understand the social consequences within the broader 
framework of the political economy of urban development and its relation to hosting mega-events such as the 
Olympic Games, which comes with a specified, unchallengeable deadline. This acts as a catalyst to what 
happens within host cities during the post-event period. The empirical in-depth analysis in this paper 
suggests that the complete eradication of VICs was challenging, and they proved to be resilient even in times 
of municipal assault in the name of the Olympic Games. Nevertheless, the Beijing experience also testifies to 
the fact that the Olympic Games has acted as a catalyst for the municipality’s vision of making Beijing a 
world city.(51) The presence of VICs may turn out to be incompatible with the municipality’s city 
development vision, and the Olympic Games opened the door to more intense intervention in Beijing’s most 
marginal, dilapidated space. 
 While most current studies of the social legacy of the Olympic Games tend to examine the scale of 
displacement of the poor, this approach needs to change so as to address the broader exclusion of poor 
residents or ethnic minorities or other types of urban marginal populations, whose stigmatization and 
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discrimination exclude them from equally sharing the new Olympic space with their urban neighbours. 
Sydney’s experience in the 1990s, in preparation for its 2000 Summer Olympic Games, showed that:  
 
“… public money being spent in this way [Games preparations] … seems to polarize the city 
population into those who consume world class entertainment and benefit in other ways from its 
presence and those who cannot and do not.”(52)  
 
Our study of the 2008 Summer Olympiad confirms this statement, and goes further to highlight that the 
Olympic experience in developing countries is likely to be many times harsher for urban marginal 
populations, who have a weak foothold due to the built-in structure of inequalities accumulated over time. 
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